Eugene Talik v. Warden Lewisburg USP by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-13-2015 
Eugene Talik v. Warden Lewisburg USP 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Eugene Talik v. Warden Lewisburg USP" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 721. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/721 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
ALD-241       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4410 
___________ 
 
EUGENE TALIK, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
WARDEN LEWISBURG USP; 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 14-cv-01117) 
District Judge:  Honorable William J. Nealon, Jr. 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 18, 2015 
 
Before:  RENDELL, CHAGARES and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 13, 2015) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Eugene J. Talik appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  We will affirm. 
 In 2008, Talik pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of West Virginia to interstate domestic violence resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2261(a)(1) and (b)(1).  He was sentenced to life imprisonment.  The District Court 
denied his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, see Talik v. United States, 2010 WL 3271973 
(N.D. W.Va. Aug. 17, 2010) (not precedential), and the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal, see United States v. Talik, 425 F. App’x 235 
(4th Cir. Apr. 26, 2011) (not precedential).  Thereafter, Talik filed an application 
requesting permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, which the Fourth 
Circuit denied.  
In June 2014, Talik filed the current § 2241 petition in the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, the district in which he is confined.  In his 
petition, Talik argued that he “was convicted and sentenced to crimes neither charge[d] 
and/or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  In particular, he asserted that the District 
Court’s use of “‘premeditation first-degree murder’ to sentence [him] to a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment of life without parole” contravened Alleyne v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013), and 
Whiteside v. United States, 748 F.3d 541 (4th Cir. 2014).  Talik believes that his 
“conviction under the relevant statute was not punishable by a mandatory minimum 
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sentence of life.”1  The District Court dismissed the § 2241 petition for lack of 
jurisdiction, concluding that Talik failed to demonstrate that he qualified for relief under 
§ 2255’s safety valve.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997).  Talik appealed.   
We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of 
the District Court’s decision to dismiss Talik’s § 2241 petition is plenary.  See Cradle v. 
U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).  Upon notification that this appeal 
would be submitted for possible summary action, Talik submitted a response containing 
argument in support of his appeal.  
  A motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court is the presumptive 
means for a federal prisoner to challenge the validity of a conviction or sentence.  See 
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  In certain limited 
circumstances, a federal prisoner can seek relief under § 2241 in the district of 
confinement if the remedy provided by § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of his detention.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 249-51.  
But we have applied this “safety valve” only in the rare situation where a prisoner has 
had no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for actions deemed to be non-
criminal by an intervening change in law.  Okereke, 307 F.3d at 120 (citing Dorsainvil, 
119 F.3d at 251).  A § 2255 motion is not “inadequate or ineffective” merely because the 
                                              
1 We note that it appears that Talik was not sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 
life imprisonment.  The opinion addressing Talik’s § 2255 motion stated that “[i]n 
imposing [the life] sentence, the Court considered several factors, including the degree of 
premeditation involved, the brutality of the offense, the efforts made to hide the crime, 
and the sentencing guideline interests of promoting respect for the law, providing just 
punishment, and protecting the general public from further crimes by the petitioner.”  
Talik, 2010 WL 3271973, at *1. 
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petitioner cannot meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of § 2255, Okereke, 307 
F.3d at 120, or because the sentencing court does not grant relief.  Cradle v. United States 
ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).   
We agree with the District Court that Talik’s allegations do not fit within the 
narrow class of circumstances where a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective 
to challenge his conviction.  In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that a fact that triggers a 
mandatory minimum sentence must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  133 S. Ct. at 2155.  As the District Court recognized, Alleyne is 
essentially an extension of Apprendi.  See, e.g., United States v. Burnett, 773 F.3d 122, 
136 (3d Cir. 2014).  In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a 
prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  We have held that “§ 2255 [i]s not inadequate or ineffective 
for [a prisoner] to raise his Apprendi argument[,]” Okereke, 307 F.3d at 121, and we see 
no reason to treat claims brought under Alleyne differently.  Additionally, Alleyne has 
not been made retroactive to cases on collateral review.  See United States v. Reyes, 755 
F.3d 210, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2014). 
In Peugh, the Supreme Court ruled that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits 
applying an amended Sentencing Guidelines provision in effect when the defendant was 
sentenced, if the amended version of the Guidelines provides a higher sentencing range 
than the version in effect when the crime was committed.  Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2078.  
Talik did not explain how Peugh is relevant to the facts of his case, but even if he had, 
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that case does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, as other courts have 
held.  See, e.g., Herrera-Gomez v. United States, 755 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 2014). 
Finally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Whiteside, 748 F.3d 541, 
is of no benefit to Talik.  In that case, unlike here, the appellant was pursuing relief in an 
initial § 2255 motion, on a claim concerning a career offender enhancement.  Moreover, 
the Fourth Circuit expressly did not decide whether relief was justified under the savings 
clause in § 2255(e).  See 748 F.3d at 547 n.4.  Furthermore, after Talik filed his § 2241 
petition, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an en banc rehearing decision in 
Whiteside affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the § 2255 motion as untimely filed.  
See Whiteside v. United States, 775 F.3d 180, 181 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the appeal presents no substantial 
question.  Therefore, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See Third 
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.       
